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MEENA ACI-IARYA

MoNARCHY, DEMOCRACY, DoNoRs, AND THE
CPN-MAOIST MovEMENT IN NEPAL:

A LESSON

FOR INFANT DEMOCRACIES

Thi s pape r rev iews the current politi cal cri sis in Nepal in hi storical , socioeconomic , and geopolitical
contex ts. On the basis of fa cts and fi gures , on th e politica l side, it is concluded that democraC)' must
grow from withi n and the structure s that d evelop mu st represe nt ex isting political forc es within the
coun tr y. Similarly, e fforts at g loba li zation must take into account th e nature of the economy. Globaliza tion is vi ewed as a multi - dim e ns ional process creating a c ulture of unlimited wants a nd mass rve
di ssat is fac tion wit h condition s of deprivation. Thi s s ituation c reates fertil e g round for in s urge nc y of
a ll kind s, as ev ident from th e current global s ituation , wh ic h includes Ne pal. ln this contex t th e paper sees ver y lilli e prospec t for agreement w ith th e tvlaoi sts, who have a complete ly social ist age nda.

INTRODUCTION
Nepal is facing an all-round crisis, encompassing
all aspects of life-economic, social, political, and
cultural. An insurgency led by the extreme left
Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-Maoist) has been
going on since 1996. The insurgency has spread in
various intensities to all 75 districts . The United
Nations National Development Program (UNDP)
estimates (quoted by the World Bank, 2004) that
significant conflicts are raging in 36 districts (see
map, opposite page), creating a third degree security
problem for the donors, and 15 districts are affected
less intensively by the conflict problems, the seconddegree security problem. Only 24 districts are
considered moderately secure for the donors and
government officials who work there. Civil society
organizations or individuals need permission from
and pay levies to the Maoists to work in rural areas
in most parts of the country [see Haddix-McKay, this
volume]. About 10,128 people have died as of March
2004 (Informal Sector Service Center [INSEC],
2004). Thousands have been rendered homeless,
thousands of women and children have lost their
livelihood providers, and hundreds of children
have been orphaned. Physical infrastructure worth.
US$ 250 million has been destroyed (Dhungel,
2004); tourism and manufacturing growth have
been severely affected; transport costs have risen
for both exports and imports; and a substantial part
of the budget has been diverted from development
to maintaining security. Economic growth has
slackened significantly.
Inquiring into the genesis and rapid growth of this
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movement is a complex task. The current crisis may
be attributed to multiple causes, political, economic,
and social. 1

FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES
Nepal was ruled by the autocratic Rana family in
the name of the king from 1846 to 1950, and by the
king himself until1990 . A brief period of democratic
experimentation during the 1950s ended in a royal
coup in 1960. For thirty years, the country was
ruled by the king directly, with a fa<;ade of elected
institutions called Panchayats at the village, district,
and national level: the Panchayat system. The current
phase of democratic governance began in 1990, when
then-King Birendra gave in to the popular demand
for democracy. A new democratic constitution,
promulgated in 1991, was a compromise between
the king and the leading political parties of the
time. Both the Nepali Congress (NC) and t~e Left
United Front (whose important leaders are now
in either The Communist Party [United MarxistLeninist, CPN-UML] or the insurgent Communist
Party of Nepal [CPN-Maoist]), played major roles
in these negotiations. The constitution established
a democratic system of governance with the King
as the constitutional Monarch, and set forth fundamental rights of speech , association, and political
participation without discrimination on the basis of
sex, ethnicity, caste, race, or religion for all citizens.
The guiding principles embodied in the constitution
make women's equality and elimination of all kinds
of economic and social inequities a priority. The Left

Nepal's failure in
participatory governance has been
monumental. The
responsibilities
for this failure
are attributable
to all the political
parties, the elite
groups, and- not
least- the donors.

Front accepted the constitution,
though vvith reservations even at
that time about the Monarchy. The
debate has continued.
The provision identifying Nepa l
as a Hindu Kingdom, and priority accorded to Nepali language,
were also debated as the constitution was developed. The issue of
a federal-versus-unitary state was
raised weakly by the Madeshis
(people native to southern plains),
and has acquired more strength
recently with the support of many
janajati groups (ethnic communities, which constitute about 32
percent of the total population).
The constitution also specifies that
all political parties must put up at
least 5 percent female candidates
for election to the House of Representatives (lower house).
The upper house, to which members are nominated by the
political parties on the basis of their respective strength in
the lower house, must have at least three women among the
60 members. The constitution guarantees equal rights to
all citizens , but the citizenship chapter of the constitution
and subsequent Acts discriminate against women in several
ways . For example, the constitution does not recognize maternal descent for natural citizenship rights, or treat the foreign spouses of male and female citizens equally. Similarly,
equal property rights are guaranteed to all citizens within
the laws, which themselves may discriminate against women. Citizenship is also an issue for recent migrants to Nepal,
who acquired it only after 1962: their children and other
dependents who were minors at that time have no right to
Nepali citizenship. Although according to the constitution,
Nepal is a Hindu Kingdom, people may practice other religions, but may not convert others. Primary education is to
be available in the mother tongue, and people have a right to
protect their own language and culture. The guiding principles make the state responsible for protection of all Nepal's
languages and culture, but on ly Nepali is recognized as a
state language.
Thus there are certain inequities embodied in the constitution itself. But more fundamental problems lie in functioning of democratic' institutions and in mechanisms for dealing
with legitimate grievances raised by the people. Under the
democracy such instit::ttions are comprised of t~e political
parties, civil society, local self-government, free-and-fair
elections, and the rule of law (Dhal, 1990). Nepal's failure
in participatory governance has been monumental. The responsibilities for this failure are attributable to all the political parties, the elite groups, and-not least-the donors.
After 1990, people had high expectations that political leaders would pay much more attention to the people's

problems than in the previous system . During the democratic movements of 1989-1990, the leaders
spoke of changes in everything
from the drinking water problem of
Kathmandu to freedom from poverty, without anticipating that they
would be held immediately responsible for such promises.
Further, Nepal has been swamped
by international human rights organizations and non-government
organizations (NGOs). Their support for particular causes (e.g. indigenous people in a country where
the concept is totally out of context;
the right of education in the mother
tongue, where there are more than
60 languages, many of them without scripts; or the right of conversion, where conversion is mostly by Christian Missionaries
from outside the country), has encouraged an explosion of
expectations. Such issues were exploited extensively both
by the CPN-Maoists and the monarchist groups, who were
opposed to the democratic changes of 1990. All these issues
may be legitimate from a democratic perspective, but they
put an inordinate stress on Nepal's infant democracy.
The political parties and the donors remained oblivious
to the brewing turmoil. While the donors offered assistance
and pushed for market oriented reforms and privatization,
the political parties in power, both in government and in
opposition, operated in an ideological vacuum. The Nepali
Congress, which ruled the country for 11 out of 14 years
after 1990, was a social democratic party in principle. lt lost
its ideological ground in the face of the international assault
on the mixed economy and its principles. The CPN-UML
also had to grope for its ideological anchor as the socialist/communist systems were dismantled. All the democratic
channels for political participation, elections, media, local
governments, and NGOs-e.g., farmer's groups, women's
groups, professional associations, various ethnic/caste
groups, trade unions etc-became bogged down in the parochial struggles of the groups and political parties devoid of
principles. Thus, most institutions that might have exerted
democratic checks and balances became dysfunctional , leaving the field entirely to the CPN-Maoists.

POLITICAL PARTIES
Nepal's political spectrum includes multiple parties and
many divisions. (Chart 1 outlines the current political
party scenario .) But most can be classified in two major
groups: left, which ranges from the extreme left to the social
democrats of various shades; and the so-called democratic
forces, from republicans to monarchists. Major groups on

Political parties promoted corruption at the individual and
party leve l, and showed neither transparency nor accountability in their functioning, in their se lection of candidates
for elections, in elect ion of party presidents and other party
officials, nor in their fundin g sources and expend iture allocations (Thapa, 2002)
judging by their behavior during the decade, major politica l parties in Nepal have lacked a clear philosophy-except
for gaining power. The Nepa li Congress, which started by
advocating social democracy and a mixed economy, veered
to the right with globalization policies that further marginalized the poor. In a country where the majority of the
population is poor, lacks primary education and the skills
demanded by a modernizing and globalizing economy, and
faces severe competition from imported labor in the job market, unrestricted liberalizat ion without any effort to expand
job opportunities for Nepali nationals was bound to be unpopular.
The United Marxist-Leninists were also not able to accommodate their concern for the poor within the framework of a
globalizing economy. Their economic and political manifestos were not much different from those of the Nepali Congress. The Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), a collection of
ex-Panchayat leaders, is slightly right of the Nepali Congress.
Its policies may veer to the right or left as political expediency require s. The Nepal Sadvabana Party (NSP) advocates
the sectar ian interests of the Madhesia population without
showing any originality in its economic programs.
Because of the practical similarity in the economic policies
advocated by the major parties in parliament, differentiating
among them has been difficult. 2 The degree to which each party
agreed to adhere to the national interest was one such element,
manifested in the politics of water resources and relations to
lndia 3 Another major issue was the efficiency of governance
bureaucracy, which deteriorated rapidly after 1991, because of
party politics (Khafle, 2002, Rajbhandari et al. , 2000).
In sum, credibility became a major problem for all political parties. They made extravagant promises and raised
unrealistic expectations vvhen out of power, and once in
power found themselves in complete confusion when they
had to implement policies exactly opposite what they had
demanded when in opposition.

the left are the Communist Party of Nepal (United MarxistLeninist-that is, CPN-Ulv!L-social democrats) and the
CPN-Maoists. The two Nepali Congress Parties (NC) and
the Nepal Sadvabana Party (NSP), those with representation
in the outgoing Parliament, have a democratic platform
allowing minimum power to the King. NC (D) and Rastriya
Prajatantra Party (RPP) believe in democracy within the
present constitution and thus are closest to the position of
the King. Other smaller party positions lie somewhere in
bet\veen these major positions.
Political Spectrum and Parties in Nepal (see Chart l.)
Political parties are the most important channel for people's
interaction with the governance process (Budge and Kernan,
1990). Parties in functioning democracies usually seek
office with a set of policies, then try to implement them once
in power. But in Nepal, political parties have shown only
office-seeking behavior. Party politics was banned between
1960 and 1990, and political parties had to · function
underground. This led to a situation in which the parties
advocating democratic governance in the country did not
practice democracy in their internal functioning. Although
the constitution explicitly states that there must be a law
under which parties would function (Covenant, 113), its
promulgation took five long years (Rajbhandari et al., 2000)
and it is still not implemented.
The country ·witnessed a disappointing period characterized by unprincipled and shifting alliances among political
parties grabbing power and unwilling to sit in opposition in
the Parliament. Parties bribed parliamentarians in order to
stay in power or pull down the government in power, and
were unwilling to face the electorate when out of government. There was blatant misuse of public resources in one's
party's interest; favoritism and nepotism in allocation of
public resources; unprincipled interventions in bureaucracy
and other public enterprises; and extensive corruption. Major political parties were exposed as incapable of democratic
governance (Acharya, 1998; Institute for Integrated Development Studies [liDS], 1996). There were 12 governments
in 12 years between 1990-2002 (Dhungel, 2004) and major
political parties split and re-combined.
Parties also fostered a culture of corruption and graft.
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VOTING AND THE ELECTORATE

THE PRESS AND THE MEDIA.

The voter turnout in parliamentary elections in Nepal was
quite high (60-70 percent). Nevertheless, this turnout was
often attributed to vote buying, and, sometimes, to illegal
practices such as booth-capturing, one person voting in
the names of others, etc. This was possible because voters
were unaware of national issues. A study completed in 1992
(liDS, 1993) reported that more than 47 percent of the 1780
respondents tabulated were not aware of the tenure of office
or the number of members in the House of Representatives,
the number of votes required to amend the constitution, or
the process of selection of the Prime Minister. Only about 19
percent of them intended to vote as per their party association.
The decisive factor reported in their voting behavior was the
candidate's personality, defined as his honesty, likeability,
and past contributions. Nearly half of the respondents
had no electoral involvement at all. Nevertheless, about 28
percent were involved in the electoral process. A later study
(1996) drew similar conclusions.

Mass media plays a powerful role in the modern world in
shaping public opinion. Mass media can generate awareness
of issues , promote a high level of mass participation in the
decision-making process, and activate and maintain a public
mechanism to regulate, balance, restrain, and control the
powers of the decision makers (See Aditya, 1996). In modern
democracies the media-the fourth estate-is supposed
to be above partisan politics, acting as keepers of social
conscience, raising a voice for justice and equity, protecting
the interests of the underdogs, and generally protecting
the democratic value system. However, in practice the
mainstream media remain under control of various groups
within the ruling elite even in developed democracies (see
Greider, 1992; Cohen and Solomon, 1995).
Nepal's private sector media , suppressed during the 30
years of the Panchayat era, have yet to mature as a channel
of public participation in the process of governance. First,
media suffers from the political fragmentation observed in
the society. There is no independent source of funding, and
the media is bound to toe the lines of individual politicians
or political parties for specific favors. Most of the media are
viewed as instruments of partisan politics or foreign parties.
Moreover, they lack professionalism and access to information. Ambivalence in His Majesty's Government's media
policy has compounded problems (Aditya, 1996; Pokharel,
1998). Most media lack a balanced perspective on gender
and equity. Naturally, the party in power and their leaders'
speeches dominate the government media. International TV
channels propagate modern consumerism and the values of
a globalizing economy, trivializing violence, and presenting
the viewpoint of the dominant powers.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
Local governments also channel citizen participation in dayto-day governance. Many of the matters of vital interest to
ordinary citizens, such as drinking water and sanitation,
the environment, and management of schools and health
facilities including hospitals, are usually allocated to local
governments. These issues are of immediate concern to
citizens. Moreover, local leaders are more approachable.
Their activities are scrutinized and judged by the local
population directly, on day-to-day basis. Therefore, in their
own interests, local leaders need to be alert and responsive
to local needs. In many cases, they may be recalled by
their constituents. Modern complex governance requires
that people at higher levels of decision-making have time
to concentrate on the national and international policies
affecting the nation. For efficient management of day-today affairs, people close to the issues at hand need adequate
autonomy in decision-making. People should be as close to
the process of governance as possible.
In Nepal, local self-government got its start in 1975. But
not until the Local Government Act of 1993 did resource
management and development planning devolve to local
bodies, which were to function as local self-governments,
though without legislative or judicial powers except in matters of resource mobilization (in limited areas). However, a
fundamental problem left unattended was the role of the bureaucracy, recruited and managed centrally but stationed in
districts and villages and expected to function under the local-self government bodies. Further, because of overwhelming party interventions even in the recruitment of secretaries
at the village level, and in the face of the Central Government's reluctance to relinquish centrally implemented projects, bureaucracies became dysfunctional (Dahal, 2001).

NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS)
AND COMMUNITY- BASED ORGANIZATIONS
(CBOS)
NGOs, following Walzer (1996), may be defined as "non-state
power oriented-people's associations and organizations."
This definition excludes political parties. NGOs in developed
countries are primarily focused on participation in the
process of governance rather than in development per se,
e.g., advocacy for environmental protection and consumer
protection, the anti-nuclear movement; such organizations
act as genuine channels of participatory democracy. But
in developing countries, NGOs and CBOs are organized
and viewed primarily as channels for effective delivery of
services (Korten, 1992).
In Nepal also, NGOs and CBOs have been more active as
important avenues for development promotion than for
political participation. Their modalities of operation, scope
of work, funding sources, and their strength and weaknesses
as development institutions have been analyzed in detail
(Bhattachan, 1998; Acharya, 1997). Only a few of them such

as Child Workers in Nepal (CWIN), the Informal Sector
Service Center (INSEC), and some women's NGOs have been
successful in raising issues and acting as advocacy groups.
\iVomen's groups have been able to raise general awareness
of women's rights. However, on political action they have
fallen short.
All sister or allied organizations of political parties,
including those of students,
women, and labor (trade
unions), have only recently
started to act together to advance their group interests.
Nevertheless, party alliances
still predominate (Dahal, M,
et al, 1999; Acharya, 2004),
and their advocacy has not
yet been converted into voting blocks. They have also become part of the unprincipled
politicking. Only since the
late nineties have ethnic/caste
based groups started to act as
advocacy groups.

•

THE MONARCHY AND THE ARMY
In Nepal, traditionally the monarchy as an institution has
been viewed as the symbol of national unity and stability,
and a strong barrier against intervention by neighbors. The
monarchy has used this position several times to its advantage
to maintain or reestablish its command over the country.
So far, the Army has been vievvecl as its protector. Most of
the Army Command comes from the Ranas, and a small
section of the population who have benefited from serving
them, although the Hill ethnic communities and Chetris
constitute the rank and file. The Nepali Congress, which
ruled most of the time during the democratic periods, never
tried to modernize it. Rather, its leaders were in competition
for the favor of Ranas, who dominated the Army and had
command over most of the country's wealth. Even when the
regime changed in 1951, the wealth amassed by pilfering
the government treasury and indiscriminate land grants
during the Ranas' 104-year-old rule was never returned
to the treasury or the people (Regmi, 1976). In early years
foreigners also were in contact only with the Ranas, as only
they spoke English and matched their life styles. Incli.a played
a crucial role in ensuring the Ranas were not treated harshly.
The first government after the revolution of 1951 was he~clecl
by a Rana prime minister. India played the middle-man role
in this settlement (Shah, 1990, volume II).
After 1990, the Army was still left untouched. The political parties mostly ignored it, not thinking about its democratization, which they are now making a slogan. The clash
with democratic government started only when the Army

command, presumably with the King's consent, refused to
move against the CPN-lvlaoists unless the political parties
were united in their demand and imposed emergency.
During the Panchayat era, particularly after King Birenclra's ascent to the throne, there were constant rumors that
the palace was a cliviclecl house. Some of the royal famil y
members wanted to treat the
dissenting political forces
more harshly. During the
democratic movement of
1990 this division of opinion continued. However,
the late King chose to make
peace with his own people
and did not bow clown to
the Indian demand to surrender to them. He agreed to
a constitution, which made
the country a constitutional
monarchy with multi-party
democracy. This was not to
the hard-liners' liking, and
PH OTO: DAWN STIEF
they were always ready tO
find fault with the government and create instability where
possible. Whether this was a planned move or just the expression of dissatisfaction, however, cannot be established.
All political forces including the CPN-Maoists used each
other for advancing their own agendas .

INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO
India and China

Sandwiched between India and China, Nepal has great
economic opportunities but very little space for its own
independent policies and programs. Nepal has a much more
intricate relationship with India than with China. China has
been largely concerned with the stability and neutrality of
Nepal and is therefore happy to support the establishment,
no matter who is in power. Even throughout the Panchayat
era, when it supported many revolutionary movements
around the world, China's policies were neutral in Nepal.
However, it did contribute to economic development by
assisting in building roads, and establishing large import
substitution industries. During the Cultural Revolution
in China, Maoist literature was translated and distributed
widely in Nepal and used to train left cadres. The short-lived,
violent left movement in Nepal during the late sixties was
also an offshoot of the Naxalite movement in India , which
was probably supported by China. But currently China has
clearly condemned the Maoists and by all indications has
nothing to do with the insurgency.
India is a different matter 4 Apart from economic depen dency on India for access to the outside world, Nepal deals
with continuous Indian intervention in Nepal's political

affairs. Nepal's political elite preserved their internal autonomy by assisting the British against India's independence
struggle during Rana rule, and the Indian establishment has
never made peace with the fact that Nepal was ·left as an
independent nation when the British left India. Some Indian
Congress leaders had wanted to annex Nepal as they did
Hyderabad. But Nehru, with his vision of Panchasheel, did
not agree to direct annexation. Nevertheless, a very unequal
treaty was imposed on Nepal. Nepal's Rana rulers , who negotiated with India for their protection in the new regime ,
signed this Treaty of Friendship in 1950. This treaty will
never lapse unless abrogated unilaterally, or changed by
agreement of the two nations.
The treaty forces Nepal to give priority to Indians in competition with foreigners for exploitation of natural resources,
in acquisition of property, and in investment opportunities on
a par with Nepali citizens, and to allow citizens free mobility
to each other's countries 5 Moreover, it also provides that when
buying arms or going to war, the two counti·ies will consult
each other. In reality, India never consults Nepal on anything,
while Nepal is kept under India's continuous surveillance.
Even the US needs India's permission to send arms to Nepal.
The democratic movement in 1990 was supported by Indian
leaders, not from their love for democracy, but because Nepal
was trying to move beyond this treaty by imposing a work
permit requirement for all foreigners, including Indians, who
sought to work in the Kathmandu Valley, and because Nepal
tried to import some small arms directly from China. Since
1950, the position of each party on this treaty has become a
constant factor in Nepalese politics 6
Further, the Indian establishment is not satisfied with
this treaty. They intervene continuously in Nepal's interand intra-party competition and between the King and the
political parties. They support one or the other and keep
them fighting, and negotiate unequal treaties vvhen they are
divided. Thus, India's support for democracy in Nepal has
always been half-hearted and partisan, motivated by the desire to put a particular leader or party in power. lvlost rulers,
whether Ranas, kings, or prime ministers , have given in to
such Indian pressure in the past. There have been only a few
exceptions. The last King Birendra, one of those , chose to
negotiate and give in to the democratic forces, rather than
bow to India in 1990.
Even today, according to close observers and Nepalese authorities, including the ex-Prime Minister Soorya Bahadur
Thapa, India is supporting both the King and the CPN-Maoists to pressure the King for more unequal treaties, partiCLllarly to establish a priority claim on Nepal's water resources.
The King is giving in slowly. Thus, though the CP.N-Maoists
named abrogation of the 1950 treaty as well as the Mahakali
Treaty with India among their major demands, now they
have put the country under more Indian influence. There
is no guarantee that the Indian establishment will not force
Nepal into India's security umbrella before they move effectively against the CPN-Maoists. They need the King in

Nepal for stability and the democratic structure to intervene
in Nepal's political affairs.
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Disintegration of the Soviet Socialist Block and Left
Strength in Nepal
After the disintegration of the socialist block, the left was
completely demoralized in the international arena. But the
communist parties of various shades together won only
slightly fewer seats than the Nepali Congress (NC), and
constituted a powerful block in the Nepalese Parliament
elected in 1991. The CPN-Maoists also had nine seats of their
own. The left forces in South Asia and the movements like
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIJVl) watched the
left's success in Nepal with great interest. But with the about
turn of the CPN-UML on economic and social policies, and
their intolerance of other left forces, ensuing intra-party and
inter-party wrangling on forming the Government, extensive
use of money and muscle during the subsequent elections, and
finally the use of the Army by the NC government to subdue
the social movement for implementation of even the existing
laws, combined to belie the hope for a peaceful transition to
a more socialistic economy. The forces in Nepal preferred to
start an armed insurgency, most likely with the advice and
help of Indian and international insurgent forces.
At this moment , it is hard to prove such conjecture, but
there are many signs. There is CPN-Maoist representation in
the RIM high command, and Nepal's outgoing prime minister recently made a categor ical statement that CPN-Ivlaoists
broke the last negotiations because they were directed to
do so by Rllvl (Kantipur, 2004). A few years ago the CPNMaoists signed a pact with Indian CPN-Maoists, stating that
when their respective countries are liberated from the capitalist system, Nepal and India will form a South Asian Commonwealth. Nepalese and Indian authorities believe that
the insurgents are collaborating in planning and executing
their actions across borders. The two left insurgent groups

in India, Peoples' War Group (PWG) and Jvlaoist Communist Center of India (MCC), have now united into a Communist Party of India (Maoist-Leninist)-CPI (ML). In 2003
a Ivlaoist communist party, the Bhutanese Communist Party
(MLM), was formed in Bhutan (www.nepalnews.com, Octo ber 14; Shrestha, 2005). Both parties have promised to work
in collaboration with CPN (Maoists) in Nepal. India only
recently has woken to this reality of insurgency cooperation
and co-ordination.
According to Lenin , imperialism should be hit where it is
weakest in order to start international socialist revolution,.
It seems from their activities that the International Revolutionary movement has singled out this part of the world,
in particular Nepal, as the best place to rouse their movement. Nepal had undergone an intensive revolutionary underground campaign in the late sixties and seventies. The
democratic forces were quite weak. The Monarchy, smarting
from the 1990 change of regime, could be used tactically
against democracy. The poor peasantry and service castes,
rapidly losing their traditional livelihood sources because of
the invasion of factory-produced goods and globalization,
could be readily lured to the utopian ideas of a communist
state and equality.

of modern transportation facilities and social infrastructure.
Although the economy grew 4-5 percent per annum during
the eighties, disparity in income and access to resources was
increasing.
The structural adjustment program, which in its initial
stages primarily benefits the well off, was started in the
mid-eighties, and accelerated after the democratic changes
of 1990. The liberalization process encompassed all sectors
of the economy: agriculture, industry, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), trade and exchange rate policies, the financial
system, transport and communications, etc. The policy reforms in the external sector were the most comprehensive
and far-reaching. Nepal now has the lowest import tariff rates
in South Asia, and full convertibility of Nepalese Rupees on
current account. Its FDI policies are liberal (Acharya, K. et
al., 1998). This process further deepened the existing cleavages and created new disparities .
The next section examines in some detail the process of
impoverishment of these sections of the population. Before
that a brief review of donor role in the economic policy-making process is presented, as government policies and programs in Nepal are formulated and implemented in close
collaboration with the donors.

ECONOMIC POLICIES AND INCREASING
DIFFERENTIATION

THE ROLE OF DONORS IN ECONOMIC
DECISIONS

Even though political mismanagement and the ensuing
frustration provided the immediate background for the
Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the continuing economic exploitation of the service castes and other ethnic groups by
the landed class, and further impoverishment of rural areas
and certain sections of the population, played a crucial role
in its rapid spread7

Donors often blame the leaders of the developing countries
for failures of development programs. Nepal is no exception
to this rule . Currently, past failures are blamed on inwardlooking policies or inadequate liberalization. There is very
little inclination among the donors to examine their own
policies and programs for elements which might have led to
accelerated mass impoverishment and disillusionment with
the system and prepared a fertile ground for CPN-Maoist
insurgency.
When Nepal embarked on its planned development in
1956, there were fevv graduates or even educated administrators. Since then bilateral and multilateral donors have
played the major role in Nepal's policy making (Panclay,
1999; Acharya, Khatiwacla and Aryal, 2004). Even after
1990, with plenty of human resources and alternative opinions in the country, the major political parties, fearful the
donors would withdraw and lured by offers of assistance,
accepted whatever was offered to them instead of requesting aiel for their own. Western donors are still so afraid of
the Communist name that even a slightly-left-of-the-center
party raises alarms. This was one the factors in overthrowing the CPN-UML government in the mid nineties 10
The 1989-1990 movement for democracy in Nepal was
successful only because it was widely supported by the left
parties working underground in Nepal throughout the Panchayat era. The overthrow of the moderate communist party,
the CPN-UML, with a social-democratic platform, discredited its ideology of peaceful ways to social revolution, and

Economic Policies
Much literature identifies the traditional economic
exploitation of disadvantaged ethnic communities and
Dalits by the high castes as the primary cause of their
support for CPN-Maoists 8 But such literature rarely deals
with the impact of globalization policies on traditional
patterns of exploitation, and consequent acceleration of class
differentiation. Neither does it go into the precise economic
processes by which this differentiation is taking place. The
emphasis is on the traditional social structures, and impact
studies of donor-funded programs 9
Nepal started its modernization venture with planned
development in 1956. Early ye.ars were devoted to build\ng
physical and social infrastructure. Benefits of growth were
spread very unevenly. Even in 2001 an overwhelming majority of Nepal's population (86 percent in 2001) still lived
in rural areas, and 20-21 districts remained unapproachable
by roads. Moreover, most of the villages are still far from motorable roads, even if roads reach the district headquarters.
More accessible rural areas benefited from the construction
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strengthened the hard liners within the left. Many of the
left cadres, who had been trained in Marxist ideology for
the thirty years of Panchayat rule, were disappointed, and
probably joined the extreme left. Currently nobody knows
who the CPN-Maoist middle-level cadres are, while most
of the Central Committee members were very much a part
of the united left in the 1989-1990 movement. So there is
very little ground now for the donors to blame the emerging
disparities and discontent entirely on the traditional social
divisions. Only after the Maoist insurgency are they starting
to reexamine their policies and programs. But the focus is
still on liberalization and privatization. Social policies still
do not constitute an integral part of the agenda.
From a review of development cooperation, Rana and
Sharma (2003) conclude that the country has been a major
playground for development experimentation, without an
internal vision and clear understanding about an effective
mechanism to address the root cause of poverty in the country. This has resulted in:
• Failure to contribute substantially to poverty reduction;
•Creation of a persistent dependency on external aid;
• Division of the society into a few benefiting from the aid
now and the many deprived of such benefits; and
•Antagonism among the general population towards international cooperation, the very state apparatus that has
fueled and escalated the CPN-Maoist connict.
Firstly, although unequal income distribution and the
need to base growth more broadly have been noted often
since the mid-seventies (Chenery et al., 1974), these issues
were relegated to the margin. Growth is still emphasized as
the first priority. "People's participation" has been a constant
part of the World Bank policy recommendations since the
mid-seventies, but after twenty-five years, poverty in 100
countries has increased, not decreased, as noted by UNDP
(2000), and the World Bank (2001) once again has had to
emphasize that human poverty is a multi-dimensional problem that needs to be attacked simultaneously in all its dimensions. But whether a globalization process controlled by
interest groups, whose primary objective is to make money
for their own sake, can generate adequate resources for the
mass of the population on the planet-and distribute them
properly to ensure poverty eradication-is yet to be seen. So
far the indications have not been positive.
World leaders and international development agencies
love to dress the same old political commitments in new
language and then forget about them. The ideas generated
become a fad for a short time, forcing all aid recipients to
rewrite their plans and programs in the newly fashionable
language. By the time they conclude this exercise new fads
are generated. Commitments made earlier are completely
forgotten. For example the Social Summit, which committed both the donors and the developing countries to specific
millennium targets to reduce poverty, is now almost forgotten by most developed countries. While-enormous amounts
are spent on wars with illusory objectives, very few devel-

oped countries have fulfilled the target of contributing 0.7
percent of their GDP as aid to developing countries, which
was agreed upon 30 years ago.
Donors emphasize theoretical assumptions. Individual
·examples of success are presented as general phenomena ,
rarely examined as specific ground realities. Nepal is a very
clear example of this. A few policy examples in Nepal are the
emphasis on agriculture, liberali zation of external trade, and
FDI now and governance.
Emphasis on agriculture in Nepal has almost become a cliche by now. From the First Plan in 1956, agricultural growth
has been emphasized, but with limited success. Agriculture
to a large extent still depends on the vagaries of nature , and
average land productivity has declined rather than increased
since the seventies. The major factors in Nepal's agricultural
stagnation are lack of infrastructure and competition from
lower-cost , subsidized Indian products. While the first factor started to receive attention in the last decade, the second
is still ignored in policy analysis. Propagation of high value
crops cannot be a short-term solution to mass poverty generated by low competitiveness of mass-produced crops. Even
Nepalese vegetables and fruits cannot compete with Indian
products that are supported by low infrastructure cost and
multiple subsidies. This has implications for both agriculture
and manufacturing. Even the orange juice manufactured in
Nepal is not based on Nepalese oranges, although Nepal is
supposed to produce the best oranges.
Since Nepal is a small country, the emphasis on agriculture and trade was correct at the macro level. But the employment/income multiplier of trade was never examined in
Nepal's specific labor market context. Except for a few cases
such as carpets, knitwear, and pashmina shawls, the direct
and indirect multiplier effects of the manufacturing industries have been largely exported. As a consequence, the reasonable GDP growth rates since the early eighties had little
impact on employment and income generation for the poor
and disadvantaged sections of the rural population. Moreover, accessibility of the vast Indian market, always assumed
in donor advised macro-economic policies, has been elusive
since the early sixties 11 (Acharya, 1995; Khan, 1999).
It is assumed that with liberalization, larger FDl \Nill now
automatically to Nepal. But in reality, FDl comes to Nepal
only if its products can enter the Indian market freely, or in
more favorable conditions, than products from other countries. And more than 75 percent of FDI now to Nepal is from
India, which comes not only with capital but labor as well. So
except in a few cases, the multiplier effect is largely exported.
This blindness continues today among the larger donors .
For example, the World Bank (NDPR, 2004) is talking about
land market, privatization, liberalization of exit policies for
organized sectors, Export Processing Zones, and expectation
of high FDI innow even under the current situation of connict, when the rural areas are largely under the control of the
insurgents, and the land of larger land-holders has been confiscated and distributed to the tillers. Privatization is pushed

incessantly, even in sectors such as drinking water, health,
and education. Ceilings on land holdings are supposed to
be lifted, and exit policies for labor made easier without any
program for redeployment of labor. These are fundamental
issues to which most of the left forces, mcludmg the CPNMaoists, are opposed. Hoping for negotiated settlement with
the CPN -Maoists on the one hand and pushing these issues
incessantly on the other creates
a paradox.
While there is no dispute that
without growth, equity cannot be achieved, emphasizing
growth and addressing the equity issues with small-scale programs such as micro-credit is no
help . The first priority should
be to make growth inclusive.
As long as the growth path itself
generates new inequities and
deepens the existing ones, small
add-on social protection programs are inadequate to redress
the inequities. Such relocation of
priorities is likely to give a different policy package from the
emphasis on growth as the first priority. For example, in Nepal a general liberalized trade regime is likely to draw most
economic activities to regions and districts vvith advanced
infrastructure facilities, as in the last decade. In the context
of social upheavals, relocating new economic activities to the
Mid-West and Far-West regions must be a priority, which
would not emerge if growth were accorded the first priority.
The problems of poverty and socio-economic exclusion in
these areas are too big to be addressed by add-on packages
of social protection.
Currently donors are talking about governance. But
governance is made into a completely technical problem.
Privatization is supposed to plug all leakages, which is not
supported by practice, as evident from cases of massive corruption in developed countries as well . Privatization mostly
converts practice considered illegal under state control into
legal practice, e.g., commissions for agency work. Further,
the focus in governance is often limited to education and
health-services delivery, where the problem is supposed to
be solved by further privatization and larger government expenditure. Other important governance issues never get attention. In Nepal, equally important are land management,
citizenship, customs and border management, police and
judiciary. All these services have been a fertile ground for
corruption. Even land entitlements are not kept properly;
people have been cheated and public land has been transferred to political workers. Grant of citizenship has been
converted into a money-minting exercise, while for authentic
Nepali citizens, specifically for women and the dalits, the process has been converted into a nightmare. All this has important and widespread impact .on people's everyday life, which

feeds their resentment of the system. No donor wants to pay
attention to these issues.
Similarly, in spite of commitment to decentralization in
their programs, donors have wasted huge amounts of money
on strengthening the district bureaucracy without making
sure that the work and powers of the central bureaucracy are
transferred to them. On the other hand they have contributed substantially to raising the
pay scale of the central bureaucracy. The Participatory District
Development Program, which
was supposed to strengthen the
bottom-up planning process, is
now mostly geared to providing
micro-credit to the groups organized under the program (Acharya and ·w right, 2000).
Thus, although Nepal has
received a continuous flow of
substantial amounts of external resources in the last 40-45
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years, the use of these resources
has remained highly inefficient
and the impact on poverty alleviation marginal at most. External aiel might have actually accentuated the problem of
poverty by increasing regional, inter-community, and interpersonal disparity in income and human development.

PROCESSES TRIGGERED BY ECONOMIC POLICIES
Erosion of the Village Livelihood Systems
Until recently the village economy used the service castes
and paid for them in cash or in kind. With the onslaught
of factory-made plastic utensils, bags, textiles, farm implements, and many other goods, these castes have lost the
market for their skills. With the decline of the role of the
household as an organization of production, manufacturing activities have been increasingly externalized, and both
male as well as female workers have lost control over the
production process configured by self-employment, and
have been transformed into wage laborers, with few alternative employment opportunities. In this process, women
and the poor were affected more, since newly emerging organized industries needed not only more capital but also more
educated and mobile laborers.
On the other hand, as land holdings were divided and subdivided among the landed households because of population
pressure , the agricultural labor market has also shrunk for
the landless service castes. The service castes have no big
landlords in need of labor to employ them as agricultural
labor. The middle class, instead of investing in land, is set
on selling the land to send their children abroad. Or they
are converting land to forestry, fruit orchards, or some other
plantation with a long gestation period, eroding the food se-

curity system of the villages. The poor are left with no access
to resources or alternative employment.
Further, the ban on traditional crops like hashish, and on
small-scale alcohol manufacturing by women for the local
market, without alternative crops or enterprises, as in Rolpa
and Rukkum has been noted by other authors (Gersony,
2003) as being among important causes of the Maoist movement , which started in these districts. Failure of the Rapti
Rural Development project to address the needs of the poorer areas further aggravated the problem. Similar conclusions
can be related to Siraha and Sarlahi, the Terai districts of
CPN-Maoist concentration. Ethnic women's fru stration and
opposition over the State's ban on local production of alcohol
was already noted in 1977 (Molnar, 1981). While the local
production of alcohol is banned, FDls and nationally owned
factories can produce and distribute alcohol freely.
Until about 1980, Nepal had relatively free land, where
the poor and lower middle class had user rights. They could
easily move and occupy government land with impunity.
National forests were accessible to all for grazing animals,
fuel , and fodder. It was disastrous for the country, for the
land and fore st resources were being exhausted fast. For
the poor, however, it was a means of livelihood. They could
move to higher-levelland. Although land with low productivity, it was a resource.
Further large tracts of private and sometimes also public
land have been enclosed by the powerful and strong in the
name of commercial agriculture. This process parallels the
16'h century enclosures in England (see Polanyi, 1957 for the
analysis of the events). Then, in England, the poor flocked to
the cities and found employment there; even then the English government had to pass the infamous Poor Laws. But in
Nepal the poor have novvhere to go.
Earlier, the poor could raise and graze livestock on community land. They could gather berries and fuel for sale and
earn their livelihood. All this stopped with the introduction
of lease and community forestry. It is true that these measures have helped to regenerate the forests to some extent,
but they have also closed the avenues of livelihood to many.
Community forestry is one of the main strategies adopted
by the government for forestry management in recent years
since the Seventh Five-year Plan, but particularly after 1990.
Traditionally, raising calves for breeding and other animals
for meat was a more practical and accessible activity for the
landless, and for marginal households and women. Small
livestock-raising has been the main activity of the poor in all
micro-credit programs But with the emphasis o.n improved
stock, commercial livestock-raising, and enclosure of public
lands by the village elite, community forests and free public grazing lands have disappeared and such small-scale
livestock raring activities have become impossible. In most
cases relatively better-off households in the village have monopolized the community forests. The poor households did
not understand its importance in the beginning and did not
participate on a large scale. There is no more community

land left. This factor has limited the scope of livestock-raising as a poverty alleviation strategy in remote and difficult
areas, precisely those areas where poverty is concentrated.
The erosion of the more or less food-self-sufficient households and the village economy without alternative , equally
productive avenues of employment and income, has had a
very traumatic effect on poor households.
Limited Impact of Export or Other Non-agriculture
Sector Growth on Alternative Employment and Income
Opportunities
With the construction of roads, market penetration in the
hinterland was begun in the 1960s and 1970s. However,
protection oflocal producers and cottage and household-level
industries also formed an important part of the development
strategy then. With more focus on liberalization, the
evaporation of a local market for locally produced products
and services accelerated significantly.
The organized non-agriculture sector was not able to generate a wide enough labor market to absorb the labor freed
by the erosion of the village livelihood systems, although
it grew faster after the liberalization, and its contribution
to GDP went up by about 20 percentage points in the 20
years since 1980. The contributions of manufacturing, trade,
restaurants, hotels, and construction particularly have increased in proportion to the decline in agriculture (see Dahal et al. , 1999; Panday, 1999; Khan, 2000; Acharya et al.,
2004). The general conclusion is that these policy packages
have reduced the role of agriculture in production and increased the market penetration into the household economy,
without substantial positive impact on the employment opportunities and livelihood options for the poor in general
and the women in particular.
For liberalization or accelerated growth of the modern
sector to benefit the masses, it must generate adequate and
more productive employment for them. Increased employment is the only channel through which the benefits of globalization may trickle down to the poor. The problem of job
creation is acute in Nepal. A majority of the unemployed are
not educationally prepared to take advantage of the expanding modern labor market, and also face severe competition
from migrant labor from India .
Unemployment also exists wit.n in the lower middle class
with small pieces of farmland and comparatively higher reservation prices of labor. In spite of the emerging unemployment
problem among the educated youth from the lower middle
class, this group is not willing to work as physical labor within the country. Nor do they want to go back to farming-and
hence they provide a fertile ground for the CPN-Maoist recruitment, as well as a source of migrants to overseas.
Reinforcement of traditional factors of differentiation
Market penetration and globalization have reinforced some of
the traditional differences in access to resources, knowledge ,
and power, based on ethnicity, caste hierarchy, and gender.

Traditionally, Nepalese society had multiple social divisions based on ethnicity, geography, and caste. Gender is
another cross-cutting factor. According to the 2001 census,
there were 100 ethnic/caste groups and sub -groups in Nepal. The first dividing line that can be drawn is between the
castes and ethnic populations, who consist of a few major
and many minor groups with less than 500 in number. Forty-eight such janajati groups are registered in Nepal. While
the Hindu population is organized on the basis of caste hierarchy, the ethnic population has no such caste divisions in
principle, although social differentiation within the groups
do exist in practice in some groups, for example among the
Newars. In 2001 the caste groups constituted 57.5 percent
of the population, the janajatis 37.2 percent, and the religious minorities 4.3 percent (Appendix Table 1; for details
see TPAMF, 2004).
There is a similar diversity in native languages of the population. Ten languages, including those spoken by at least
1.5 percent of the population, accounted for 90 percent of
the population (Appendix Table 2). It is one of the dividing factors between the Madheshis (plains people) and the
hill people. Madheshis, although within the Hindu caste
hierarchy, speak north Indian local languages, while ethnic groups have their own languages. Nepali is the mother
tongue for 49 percent of the population, the lingua franca
for other communities, and the only language allowed in official transactions. This has become a contentious issue for
all non-Nepali speakers. Non-recruitment to the Army is
another issue raised by the Madheshis.
The ethnic and Madheshi populations want a federal state
structure along linguistic divides, use of local language in
local government business, and more equitable representation in the political and administrative echelons of power
(Gurung, 2003).
The Hindu group is divided into multiple groups by caste,
which often overlaps with class. Brahmans are at the top
of the hierarchy and the Dalits (traditional service castes,
or untouchables at the bottom). Recent information on
comparative socio-economic and political status of various

groups shows that Dalits and some of the ethnic groups, particularly from the Terai and remote areas, had almost zero
access to higher education and positions of power. As discussed above, economic modernization and the structural
adjustment programs had a disproportionately intense impact on them and increased the traditional differentiation
in their access to resources, knovvledge, and employment
opportunities. They are agitating for more equitable access
to resources, education, and power.
Although nearly 81 percent of the population has declared
itself Hindu in the 2001 Census, a large group is Buddhist.
People also practice a number of other indigenous religions .
The issue of the Hindu State, which was taken up originally
only by the recent Christian converts, has now become a
contentious issue for most non-Hindu ethnic elites in the
country, who claim their own religion or Buddhism.
These sources of conflict overlap with crosscutting issues
such as poverty and gender, which tend to intensify the
problems of socio-political disadvantage. Gender discrimination cuts across all castes, ethnicity, geography, and class.
Women are discriminated against not only socially but even
in law. There are 54 laws and 120 by-laws and clauses which
discriminate against women (FLWD, 2000), in spite of the
fact that Nepal's constitution says that any law contravening
the International Agreements to which Nepal is a party is
void. Major areas of legal discrimination include citizenship
and property rights. More equitable access to resources, education, and power form the major points of their demands.

OVERALL IMPACT
As a consequence of the multiple factors discussed above,
Nepal was not able to make any significant gains in reducing
income poverty, especially in rural areas in the last three
decades. Even a World Bank (Prennusi, 1999) estimate put
42 percent of the Nepalese below the basic-needs poverty
line in 1995\96-that is, unable to meet their basic needs of
minimum calories, shelter, drinking water, basic education,
and primary health care.

Table 1. Long-term Issues for Nepal

Political
A. Governance Structure
1. Position of Monarchy
2. Decentralized or Federal
3. Representation of social groups in
Power structure
B. Foreign policy Overall-Relation to the
World powers
1950 Treaty with India
India-Nepal border
Other unequal treaties
Gorkha recruitment

Socio-Cultural
Status of languages other than
Nepali
Hindu or Secular State
Social status of Dalits
Legal and Status of Women
• Citizenship
• Property
• Other
Citizenship issue of the Indian
emigrants

Economic
Neo-liberal
Social Democratic
Socialist

Traditional divisions entwined with class differentiation
and the urban/rural/regional divide have combined to produce deeper differentiation in access to resources, education and power structure (See Appendix Tables 3 and 4 and
TPAMF, 2004 for details) and resulted in mass fru stration for
the serv ice castes, poor women, and many youths from all
communities, especially disadvantaged ones. New conflict
points generated by such developments cut across gender,
caste, and ethnicity, and include the rural/urban divide in
access to resources, highly educated/uneducated or semieducated in access to new sources of livelihood , the capitalist/feudal divide among the haves, capitalist/worker divide,
lower peasantry/capitalist/feudal divide, and the like.
The fact that liberalization has led to a more dualistic
world economy has also been noted by UNDP in 1995 Human Development Report (HDR):
"Since 1980 th ere has been a dramatic surge in economic growth
in 15 countries, bringing rapidly rising incomes to many of their
1. 5 billion people, more than a qu arter of the wo rld 's population ..
Over much of this period , however, economic decline or stagnation
has affected 100 countries, reducing the incomes of 1.6 billion
people-again , more than a quarter of the world's population. In
70 of these countries average incomes are less than they were in
1980-and in 43 countries less th an they were in 1970".

It labels this growth as: "jobless-ruthless-voicelessrootless-[utu reless."
Nepal is a clear example of this dualistic development. No
wonder the Maoist insurgency in Nepa l is finding support
from the impoverished rural population. Most insurgencies
in history have been peasant movements, and the Maoist
movement is one of them 12 CPN-Maoists are finding their
main recruits from the service castes, disadvantaged communities and women, who have been the major losers in the
accelerated market penetration of the rural economy, partly
as a consequence of market-oriented development and partly
because of structural adjustment policies. The World Bank
(2004) itself had to accept the link between the development
indicators by districts and the intensity of the Maoist insurgency in its recent policy revie·w paper.

PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
Thus the issues for a negotiation with the CPN-Maoists are
multiple and are both short and long term. CPN-Maoist
insurgents, with their communist propaganda of equality
in all fields, have been able to exploit all these grievances.
Their agenda of socio-political change is framed accordingly.
A major question is whether agreement with CPN-Maoists is
possible in this scenario.
·
In an immediate perspective the negotiations seem to be
deadlocked between CPN-Maoists wanting a Round Table
Conference with the King's direct participation and Constituent Assembly, with the pa lace/Government not responding to
the first and not agreeing to the second. Issues on the agenda
for negotiation in the longer term are summarized in the table

below. It clearly shows that the Maoist agenda for a socialist
state and Republic are likely to remain as points of disagreement on any longer term perspective. Of the three contending parties-the democratic forces, the Army/King or the
CPN-Maoists-who will surrender will depend on military
strength on the one hand and popular support on the other.
The issues of structural discriminat ion have been aggravated in the last decade because of political corruption, lack
of social perspective in economic policies of structural adjustment, rising expectations of the masses, and social traditionalism among the politicians. Economic policies fostering
dependency on foreign aid and foreign employment have led
to the emergence of new classes, "fragmented personalities",
and "multiple states" leading to contradictory decisions,
constant shifts in inter- and intra-party political coalitions
to exploit the state resources, grow th of non-competent
bureaucracy, and radicalism among the overdeveloped nonproductive classes. In Nepal this radicalism has resulted in
the CPN-Maoist insurgency. This radicalism found ready
ground for its activities among the impoverished masses.
(See Table l for the long-term issues that need a solution)
As for finding compromises acceptable to the conflicting
parties, the most difficult issues seem to be those related to
the monarch, state structure, and foreign (specifically relating
to India) and economic policies. Currently CPN-UML, NSP,
and NC have joined hands to form a government, which also
has two King's representatives. The government can hardly
move towards negotiations with the CPN-Maoists without
the King's (Army) concurrence. The mother NC together with
splinter left parties and splinter NSP are still agitating, presumably for restoration of the dissolved House, while the King
and the government want to conduct new elections. There are
differences within the government as to what to do first: negotiate with the CPN-Maoists or hold an election.
In spite of the differences in language used by various political parties, there is an agreement on the issue that the
system needs to be more equitable and participatory, taking
into account the caste hierarchy, the ethnic and the geographical divisions, and gender. A meaningful devolution of
power redrawing the boundaries and reducing the number
of districts or a federal structure may be debated. Reservation of seats in the National Parliament or a more powerful
Upper House representing and having the decisive voice in
ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and gender issues may also be
considered. The need for strengthening the prime ministerial system guaranteeing the fundamental rights, rule of law,
etc. is also mostly agreed upon.
Differences are large on the political agenda. Although all
major parties agree on the question of vesting sovereignty in
the people, different parties interpret this clause differently.
The parliamentary parties want to reduce powers of the
Monarchy accorded by the 1991 constitution. The outgoing
government , which was much closer to the King's position,
proposed development of the monarchical system in accordance with its status and dignity defined by the 1991 con-

stitution, although it has not made clear what 'development
of the system' means. According to the King's one interview,
he wants a more active role in governance, using his powers to draw the attention of the authorities towards dissenting views of various sections of the population. He wants to
play a constructive role to strengthen the democratic system
within the constitutional framework. Political parties are
very suspicious of this constructive role.
or particular importance is the de-facto structure and
command of the Army. The parliamentary parties and the
CPN-Maoists contend that it is currently controlled by the
palace. They seek to transfer its control fully to elected government, after giving it a national character, whereas the
establishment claims that the Army is already under the
control of the Parliament. Additionally, the NCP-CPN-Maoists demand to include its insurgent army and militia in the
Army's reorganization. This is a tricky issue, which needs to
be resolved before any election can take place.
The CPN-Maoists wish to determine the King's future
through referendum or an elected constituent assembly, and
propose amendment of any provision of the constitution
through referendum. The establishment, on the other hand,
has said that the sacrosanct elements of the constitution
should not be subject to referendum.
On the state structure the differences are also quite significant. The CPN-CPN-Maoists have offered the right of
self-determination to ethnic groups (whether it means the
Soviet or Chinese model). The five parliamentary parties
and the establishment would accept the plurality existing in
the country but they would deal with it within the unitary
state structure by empowering local self-government to decide local matters .
Foreign policy, particularly the degree of closeness to India , is another point of discord . NCP-CPN-Maoists vvould
like to revoke the 1950 Treaty with India , as well as what
they call unequal treaties with the western countries, and
close the Gorkha recruitment centers. No other party would
go to that extent.
Similarly, the CPN-Maoists and other left groups prefer
a secular state, while the democtatic front of all hues and

colors would only make the interpretation of existing provi sions on practice of religion more liberal.
In spite of the principle of gender equality to which all
parties pretend to agree, equality in citizen ship rights is not
even on the negotiating table. Even the so-called revolutionary CPN-Maoists have not been able go b eyond the conventional lvlarxist approach to women's issues. It is not free
of patriarchal value systems (Pettigrew and Shneiderman,
2004). To go by historical evidence from the former socialist
bloc and China, a socialist or a !Vlarxist regime makes women's choices more limited by curtailing individual freedom
on marriage, family life, children, etc. It does provide some
space for participation in public life, but still excludes them
from decision-making positions.
The major difference between the CPN-CPN-Maoists on
the one hand and the other two parties on the other is on
economic policies. While the CPN-CPN-Maoists demand a
total socialist agenda of change, the CPN-UMN and other
left parties seem to be more for a more mixed economy,
while the democratic parties and the establishment are for
neo-liberal economic policies. That seems to be the crux of
the problem in the long run.

LESSONS
Importing institutional structures does not establish
democracy. Democracy must be context-specific and evolve
out of internal conditions. The structures that develop must
represent existing political forces within the country.
Current capitalist commercialization and globalization
is not only an economic process. Although economics does
form the foundation for other aspects of globalization, it is
a multi-dimensional process creating a culture of unlimited
wants and massive dissatisfaction with conditions of deprivation. Economically, globalization creates massive economic disparities, hitting the poorest the hardest. People can
not tolerate for long the increasing deprivation on the one
hand and unprecedented affluence on the other. Politically
globalization concentrates resources and power among the
rich and powerful, both globally and nationally, reinforcing
traditional inequities. For globalization to advance smoothly
it must grow out of a country's economic needs and competitive capacity. If imposed from outside it is bound to cause
massive socio-economic dislocations.
The only way the structural adjustment and privatization
programs can have a positive impact on poverty is through
increased private sector investment and FDI and the employment-income-employment multiplier cycle. The masses
are supposed to benefit from this expansion of opportunities
by investment in education. But this cycle is affected by multiple other social, political, and contextual economic factors,
which are conveniently ignored in the economic models.
The assumed transmission mechanism rarely materializes,
unless specific social, political, and structural factors are
taken into account . Nepal may be taken as a glaring example

where these assumptions did not materialize. By now it is
clear that all East and South Asian countries so often presented as examples of market-led development were really
led by the State (Klitgaard, 1991).
While the growth path itself generates new inequities and
deepens existing ones, to expect minor add -on social pro tection programs such as micro -credit and food-for-work to
redress the inequities is very unrealistic. These programs are
often too small to have an impact on mass scale employment
loss. Moreover, micro-credit can work only when there are
adequate market opportunities as in Bangladesh, not in the
inaccessible areas like those where Nepal's poor live. ln Nepal, multiple government and NGO/lNGO programs with
micro-credit supplied less than five percent of the total rural credit and covered less than 3 percent of the borrowing
population (Acharya et al., 2003).
Emphasizing just growth and looking at the macro picture
only without specific attention to groups who suffer from
these policies is bound to generate political upheavals. The
growth path itself must lead to more equitable distribution of opportunities and access to resources. This can be
achieved only if there is a mechanism in place for participatory democracy in reality and not a system dominated by
the traditionally powerful and the strong socio-economic
groups and the rising capitalist class.

Small countries like Nepal have very little space to maneuver. They cannot opt out of the global system. The choice
for them is not integration or no integration in the world
economy. They are already integrated into the world economy, oi1e way or another. The issue is that of changing the
terms of integration to benefit the masses and not only the
international/national capital and the few who control it.
Globalization policies must be rooted in the country-specific realities and perceived to be just and leading to overall
improvement in the living standards of the masses. ln Nepal much of the macro-economic policymaking has failed
to yield the results expected of them, precisely because the
models used for policy conclusions do not incorporate adequate dimensions of Nepalese, and the international contextual reality, such as market constraints on exports, lndia
or overseas, or the free flow of labor and capital between
lndia and Nepal.
Similarly democracy is about balancing interests of various groups. One cannot impose policies in abstract and
hope that everything will go well. ln this age of democratic
aspirations and equitable development, our model cannot be
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia , China, or Cuba, where
political freedom was totally suppressed during the early
stages of economic development. The political economy of
development must be at the center of all economic policies.
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Appendix Table l: Ethnic\Caste Composition of the Population
I~.Wi1f[t'lt{lliJ~

A
A.1
A.l.l
A.l.2
A.2

Caste Grou]JS
High Castes (Al.l+Al.2)
Hill B/C+ (Brahman, Chhetri, Thakuri, Sanyasi)
Terai B/C+ (Brahman, Raiput, Kayastha, Baniya, Marwadi,Jaine, Nurang, Bengali)
Terai Middle Castes (Yadav, Teli , Kalwar, Sudhi, Sonar, Lahar, Koiri, Kurmi, Kanu, Haluwai,
Hajam/Thakur, Badhe, Bahae, Rajbhar, Kewat, Mallah, Nuniya, Kumhar, Kahar, Lodha,
Bing/Banda, Bhediyar, Mali, Kamar, Dhunia)
A.3
Dalits
A.3 .1
Hill Dalits (Kami, Damai, Sarki, Gaine, Badi)
A.3.2
Terai Dalits (Chamar, Musahar,Dhusadh/Paswan, Tatma, Khatway, Bantar, Dom, Chidimar,
Dhabi, Halkhor, Dalit/Unidentified Dalit)
B
janajatis (Ethnic Groups)
B.1
Hilljanaiatis (B.l.l+B.l.2)
B.l.l
Newar/Thakali
B.l.2
Other Hill Janajatis (Magar, Tamang, Rai, Gurung, Limbu, Sherpa, Bhote, Vlalung,
Byansi, Hyolmo, Gharti/Bhujel, Kuma!, Sunuwar, Baramu, Pahari, Adivasi janajati,
Yakkha, Chhantal, Jirel, Darai, Dura Majhi, Danuwar, Thami, Lepcha , Chepang, Bote,
Raii, Hay_u, Raute, Kusunda
B.2
Terai janajatis (Tharu, Dhanuk, Rajbanshi, Tajpuriya, Gangai, Dhimal, Meche, Kisan,
Munda, Santhal!Satar, DhangC~d/jhangad, Koche, Pattarkatta/Kusbadiya
c.
Religious Minorities
D.
Unidentified
Total

.

I

ft!t

lfJJ

't!b

57.5
32.8
30.9
1.9

12.9
11.8
7.l

4.7
37.2
28.5
5.5

23.0
8.7
4.3
l.O
100

100

100

-

Appendix Table 2: Major Languages Spoken in Nepal
LANGUAGE GROUP

PERCENT POPULATION

Nepali (Hills)

48.6

t'-'laithali (Terai)

12 .3

Bhojpuri (Terai)

7.5

Tharu (Terai)

5.9

iamang (Hills)

5.2

Newari (Hills)

3.6

Magar (Hills)

3.4

Awadhi (Terai)

2.5

Gurung (Hills)

1.5

Limbu (Hills)

1.5

92.0

Total

Appendix Table 3: Literacy Rate, Educational and Professional Attainment by Caste/Ethnicity, 2001
~ /.4gjllrJ;II;I~Uc; [ftl{lll~:,l

Ulli!Ul:~t.'1., [l'mM,W

I:IIUir•.:.••[IJ~I

Percent of 6 years +
Literacy

.

Percent of economically active

Administrators,
Graduate+ Non-agric.
occupations managers,
politicians, high
officials etc.

SLC+

liiiii:!(U"

Professionals,
Technicians ,
and associates

67.5

16.7

3.6

34.5

1.0

8.1

Hill B/C+

67.1

16.2

3.4

32.4

1.0

7.8

Terai B/C+

73 .9

24.8

6.5

69.2

1.7

12. 2

Hill/Terai BIC+

Terai Middle Caste

41.7

7.0

1.1

36.3

0.3

3.0

Dalits

33.8

1.3

0.1

30.7

0.1

0.6

Hill Dalits

41.9

1.4

0.1

30.9

0 .1

0.7

Terai Dalits

21.1

l.l

0.1

30.4

0 .0

0.5

53.6

6 .9

1.1

31.7

0.5

3.3

56.2

7.7

1.3

31.8

0.6

3 .6

72.2

2.0.3

4.2

58.0

1.7

8.4

janajatis
Hill j anajatis
Newa r/Tha ka li

52. 1

4.5

0.5

23.4

0.3

2.1

Terai j anajatis

44.8

4.0

0 .5

31.3

0.2

1.9

Religious Minorities

34.5

3.1

0.6

48.4

0.2

1.7

40.2

0.8

4.3

33.6

0 .6

4.6

Other Hill j anajatis

Others

50.1

9.6

2.5

Total

53 .7

9.4

1.8

Appendix Table 4: Female\ Male Ra tios of Education and Professional Attainment by Caste/ Ethnicity, 2001

Percent of 6 years +

Hill!Terai B/ C+

Percent of economically active

Literacy

SLC+

Administrators, Professionals\
Graduate+ Non-agric.
occupations managers,
Technicians,
politicians , high and associates
officials etc.

72.5

46.0

20.5

104.8

0.3

3.5

19. 5

110.4

0.3

3.4

Hill B/C+

72.8

45.9

Terai B/C+

69.1

46.1

29.9

31.7

0.6

7.8

42.4
57.2

20.3
27.4

11.2
18.6

46.6
103.9

0.1
0.0

0.8
0.2

Hill Dalits

65.4

32. 3

19.5

117.2

0.0

0.3

Terai Dalits

36.1

18.7

17.1

74.4

0.0

0.1

68.9

50.2

35.3

95.4

0.2

1.8

73.1

56.4

39.1

99.9

0.3

2.1

Terai Middle Caste
Dalits

Janajatis
Hill Janajatis
Newar/Thakali

77.9

61.8

43.6

75.7

0.8

6.3

Other Hill j an ajatis

71.4

50.5

30.6

107.2

0.1

l.l

Terai j anaj atis

53.1

19.7

8.3

74.5

0.0

0.5

Religious Minorities

46.3

24.8

22.0

41.8

0.0

0.4

Others

61.2

46.6

32.3

80.2

0.3

2.6

Total

65.8

43.6

22.9

91.6

0.2

2.2

ENDNOTES

PHOTO: D AWN STIEF

1 [editors' noLe: Articles in Himalaya volume XX III number 1
also explore this theme!
2 For example see Compilat ion of their Election Man ifestos by
the Poverty Watch Civic Forum, 1999.
3 Please refer to the liDS Yearbooks , 1996 and 1997 fo r a review
of the events.
4 This section relies primarily on newspaper publications in Nepal and India and a few books, which has been summarized by
Dhungel in his recent paper (2004). [ed itors' note: See also Richard
Bownas's paper in Himalaya XXlll:I for more on this topi c!
5 Even Kashmir and Assam may bar Indi an citizens from buying
land in their states, but Nepal cannot impose such restrictions on
Ind ian citizens by this treaty.
6 See Shailend ra Upadhaya, Tryst with Democracy 1991 and
S.D. lvluni , India and Nepal1 992
7 See Ge rsony, 2003 and Shneiderman and Turin, 2004, for indepth ana lyses of specific districts w ithi n the Maoist hold.
8 For a recent summary, see Lawoti, 2003.
9
See llDS, 2004 for a summary literat ure review.
10 The World Bank and the HvlF seemed alarmed when the UML
government declared an old age social security of about US $ 2 per
month, and budgeted NRS 200,000 to eve ry Village Development
Committee managed by the locally elected bodies. Currently these

lenders consider this as the best program (2004). The Prime Minister in offi ce requested me to convince the South Asian Director of
ADB that they were only social democrats. l ca rried the message to
the Direc tor, after whi ch he ca me to Nepa l to meet the gove rnn;ent
leaders. The V/orld Bank in the meantime ca ncell ed its already ap pro ved loan for the Arun H ydro elec tri c project, wh ich it sa id was
because of environmental reasons. But many Ne palis were very
skeptical, and the Arun Project cancellation beca me an indicati on of how intern ation al lenders would treat th e gove rnment, if
it re~1a ined in power. This became a good political issue , which
the so-called democratic opposition, NC, picked up to oppose the
minority gove rnment.
11 Current examples are tea, pashmina, and medicine, all of
which are Nepa l's comparative advantage products, on which India has been imposing import duties on one or another prete xt,
in spite of the free access facilities incorporated in the currently
operating Trade Trea ty.
12 For exa mpl es of in-depth case studies from Nepal, see Shneiclennan and Turin, 2004 and Gersony, 2003
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